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Abstract: In this paper, we start with quantifying the worldwide tariff pass-through, i.e., the impact of 
tariff reductions on trade prices. We find that a 1% reduction of tariffs decreases trade prices by 0.1%, i.e., 
a negative tariff pass-through (Lerner paradox). To uncover the mechanism underlying this result, we 
decompose trade prices into product quality and quality-adjusted trade prices. As a result, we found that 
a 1% reduction of tariff rates decreases product quality by 1.2% and increases quality-adjusted trade 
prices by 1.1% (Metzler paradox). We construct a theoretical model that demonstrates the mechanism 
behind these empirical results. We suggest that both a firm-delocation mechanism under variable 
markups and a quality-sorting mechanism are the driving forces behind these empirical findings. Lastly, 
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1. Introduction 
     The impact of a tariff reduction or elimination on trade prices, a so-called “tariff pass-
through,” has long been studied in the international economics literature. Tariff pass-
through is vital in considerations of whether and to what extent trade liberalization benefits 
households (Han et al., 2016) and whether it is a pro-poor policy in liberalizing countries 
(Marchand, 2012). Empirical findings on tariff pass-through are also important when we 
consider what kind of international trade rules should be set up. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) 
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have theoretically shown that tariff reforms under a particular form of reciprocity rule 
improve all countries’ welfare. However, depending on the magnitude and direction of the 
pass-through, this result of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) could be overturned (Bagwell and 
Staiger, 2016).1 Understanding tariff pass-through is thus an essential issue for evaluating 
the effects of trade liberalization. 
There are various possible degrees and directions of tariff pass-through. For instance, 
suppose that a country reduces its import tariff on a particular product. If foreign firms’ 
export prices of that product remain unchanged, this tariff reduction is perfectly passed 
through to the consumer price, and consumers in that country fully capture the rents from 
this trade liberalization.2 On the other hand, if the foreign firms raise their export prices in 
response to the tariff reduction, part of the rents goes to these firms, and the importing 
country’s terms of trade deteriorate. Furthermore, if the increases in export prices are large 
enough, trade liberalization may even raise the consumer price in the importing country. 
Such an unusual consequence is known as a “Metzler paradox” (Metzler, 1949). Conversely, 
the possibility exists that a tariff reduction decreases export prices and consumers would gain 
more than the extent of tariff reduction, thereby improving the importing country’s terms 
of trade. This case is referred to as a “Lerner paradox” (Lerner, 1936). 
Existing empirical studies have quantified the tariff pass-through for particular 
countries, particular products such as textiles and apparel, and particular tariff preference 
schemes, such as Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). An early empirical work on the 
issue is that of Feenstra (1989), who investigated the tariff pass-through in the US imports 
from Japan using product-level import data. By employing firm-level export data, Ludema 
and Yu (2016) and Görg et al. (2017) investigated the tariff pass-through when exporting 
from the US and Hungary, respectively. Several studies have examined the effects of tariff 
reduction through preferential/regional trade agreements (RTAs) (Cadot et al., 2005; 
Olarreaga and Ozden, 2005; Ozden and Sharma, 2006; Cirera, 2014). These studies have 
found an incomplete tariff pass-through, i.e., only part of tariff reductions is passed onto 
trade prices. Among others, the firm-level study by Ludema and Yu (2016) showed that the 
Metzler paradox is possible because a tariff reduction may increase consumer prices in some 
cases.3 
In this paper, we start with quantifying and investigating the worldwide tariff pass-
through. Surprisingly, estimates of the tariff pass-through on worldwide trade are not 
available in the literature. One critical reason for unavailability of such estimates is that a 
ready-made database on worldwide tariffs had not been available until recently. Such a 
                                                   
1 Raimondos and Woodland (2018) proposed an alternative rule of reciprocity in tariff reforms that 
improves welfare without any assumptions regarding the price effects of tariff changes. 
2 In this paper, we do not differentiate among export prices, import prices, and trade prices, but use those 
three prices interchangeably. All these terms mean tariff-exclusive prices in this paper. Tariff-inclusive 
prices are called “consumer prices” in this paper. 
3 They called the case “quasi-Metzler paradox” because quality changes are reflected in their price 
changes.  
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database is now provided by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The database 
includes information on various kinds of tariff schemes, such as most favored nation (MFN), 
RTAs, or the GSP in almost all countries worldwide. Combining such tariff information with 
data on unit trade prices drawn from UN Comtrade, we estimate the global average of tariff 
pass-through. Our dataset includes bilateral trade between 70 importers and 172 exporters 
during 1992–2014, at the harmonized system (HS) six-digit level. Surprisingly, we found a 
robust result that the tariff reduction decreases trade prices, i.e., negative tariff pass-through. 
Specifically, it shows that a 1% reduction of (one plus) tariffs decreases trade prices by 0.1%. 
To elucidate the mechanism underlying our result of this negative tariff pass-through, 
we decompose trade prices into product quality and quality-adjusted trade prices by 
employing the method proposed by Khandelwal et al. (2013). As a result, we found that a 
1% reduction of (one-plus) tariff rates decreases product quality by 1.2% and increases 
quality-adjusted trade prices by 1.1%. As found above, for gross trade prices, the net effect 
is a 0.1% fall. The positive relationship between tariffs and quality is a key factor behind the 
negative pass-through. Namely, because the effect on product quality is absolutely larger 
than that on quality-adjusted prices, the net effect on gross trade prices becomes negative. 
In other words, we found a Lerner paradox for gross prices. This result is in sharp contrast 
with that of Ludema and Yu (2016), who theoretically and empirically found that a Metzler 
paradox is possible in that trade liberalization can increase consumer prices by enhancing 
quality upgrading of exported products. Furthermore, our results suggest that a 1% tariff 
reduction increases quality-adjusted trade prices by more than 1%, which implies that trade 
liberalization increases quality-adjusted consumer prices (i.e., Metzler paradox). In other 
words, Lerner meets Metzler in the sense that we observe a Metzler paradox for the quality-
adjusted price and a Lerner paradox for the gross price at the same time.  
Several theoretical studies might be useful to understand these empirical results. Some 
papers have clarified that unilateral trade liberalization may result in a Metzler paradox 
(Venables, 1987; Bagwell and Staiger, 2012; Bagwell and Lee, 2015).4 Among them, Bagwell 
and Lee (2015) extended the heterogeneous-firm trade model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
and showed that a lower import tariff causes a firm-delocation effect, which reduces the 
competitiveness of the domestic market and raises the product-average consumer price.5 
Some papers have considered changes in product quality within the same framework 
(Antoniades, 2015: Ludema and Yu, 2016) and demonstrated that quality changes might 
lead to a Metzler paradox for gross prices at the firm level. Because we use product-level 
data on worldwide trade, our estimate is the product-average tariff pass-through, rather 
than the firm-specific tariff pass-through. Indeed, none of these papers can explain the 
presences of a Lerner paradox for average gross prices. 
                                                   
4 Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008) showed that a simultaneous reduction of tariffs with other importing 
countries may generate a Metzler paradox.  
5 Demidova (2017) showed that a Metzler paradox of Bagwell and Lee (2015) no longer holds if a 
homogenous good sector under perfect competition is removed from the model.  
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To formalize these empirical findings, we provide a model that incorporates both the 
firm-delocation mechanism of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the quality-sorting 
mechanism of Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) or Johnson (2012). Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) 
and Johnson (2012) incorporated product quality into Melitz (2003) and provided a quality-
sorting mechanism that explained a positive correlation between gross average export prices 
and bilateral trade barriers such as distance. Although these papers did not explicitly 
investigate the price effects of tariffs, their results indicate that quality sorting is a key 
mechanism behind existence of a Lerner paradox. These papers, however, did not explain 
the presence of a Metzler paradox for quality-adjusted prices. By formulating a quality-
sorting mechanism in a Melitz-Ottaviano type model of firm-delocation, however, our 
model is able to provide the concurrence of a Lerner paradox for gross average prices and a 
Metzler paradox for quality-adjusted average prices, which is consistent with the empirical 
findings on worldwide trade. Namely, although a lower tariff decreases the average 
consumer price of imported products, it comes with even lower quality of these products 
and thereby increases quality-adjusted consumer prices. 
Employing this theoretical model, which is able to explain our empirical results, 
allows us to also examine the welfare effect of these price changes. Seemingly, unilateral 
trade liberalization benefits consumers in the liberalizing country because it reduces 
consumer prices to a greater extent than the reductions in tariffs. However, this is not 
necessarily the case in our model, where unilateral trade liberalization leads to a substantial 
decline in the average quality of imported products but an increase in the quality-adjusted 
consumer price. Furthermore, unilateral trade liberalization decreases the number of 
product varieties available for consumers. Because of these effects, it can be concluded that 
unilateral trade liberalization worsens consumers’ welfare in the liberalizing country. To 
guarantee consumer benefits from trade liberalization, additional policy instruments should 
accompany unilateral trade liberalization. For example, a competition policy that reduces 
the fixed cost of entry and enhances the domestic entry is one such possible instrument for 
the purpose.  
In addition to the above literature on tariff pass-through, our study is related to at least 
two more bodies of literature. First, some studies have examined the effects of tariffs on firm 
performance rather than on export product prices. For example, Bustos (2011) explored the 
effect on firm innovation and found the statistically significant positive effects. Second, 
although the above literature has investigated the effects of tariffs in export destination 
countries, Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) and Fan et al. (2015) studied the impacts of “input 
tariffs” in export-origin countries. “Input tariff” refers to tariffs on products and 
intermediate goods used for production of a given export product. Those studies 
empirically found that a reduction of input tariffs enables firms to import higher-quality 
inputs and raises the quality of export products. The effects of input tariffs on firm 
performance indicators such as productivity were also examined in Amiti and Konings 
(2007).  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the global 
average of tariff pass-through. We also examine how a tariff change affects trade prices 
through changing product quality and quality-adjusted prices. In Section 3, we theoretically 
investigate the relationship of tariffs with gross prices, product quality, and quality-adjusted 
prices. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Global Average of Tariff Pass-through 
This section presents the global average of tariff pass-through. Specifically, after 
presenting results on the effect of tariffs on gross trade prices, we decompose their effects 
on quality-adjusted prices and quality. 
 
2.1. Effects on Gross Prices 
We begin with analyses of gross prices. As mentioned in the introductory section, we 
employ data from UN Comtrade for trade data and WITS for tariff data. Gross trade prices 
are computed by dividing trade values by trade quantities in terms of kilograms. We use 
trade data reported by importers. Our tariff variable is defined at a country pair-product-
year level. Namely, we take into account the existence of preferential tariff rates such as RTA 
tariff rates and tariff rates for GSP. When multiple tariff schemes are available, we assume 
that exporters always use the scheme with lowest tariff rate. In both trade and tariff data, 
we consistently use the six-digit code from the 1992 HS version. Therefore, tariff rates 
defined at a tariff-line level are aggregated at the six-digit level by a simple average. As a 
result, our dataset is very comprehensive and includes 70 importers, 172 exporters, and 23 
years (i.e., 1992–2014).6 
With this dataset, we estimate the following simple equation: 
ln 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 ln(1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝐮 + 𝜖ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
where phijt represents before-tariff (tariff exclusive) trade price from country i to country j in 
product h at year t. As mentioned above, a product is defined at the HS six-digit level in our 
analysis. Tariffhijt is the aforementioned tariff rates of country i for product h imported from 
country j at year t. For example, when tariff rates are 10%, it takes a value of 0.10. Its 
coefficient β indicates the degree of tariff pass-through. Specifically, it shows how many 
percentages the trade prices change when (one-plus) tariff rates rise by 1%. u is various sets 
of fixed effects, which are explained later. 𝜖ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the disturbance term. We estimate this 
equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) method.7 
                                                   
6 These countries are listed in Appendix A. 
7 One issue with this estimation may be the sample selection. Namely, given that we can observe the data 
on trade prices only when the concerned products are traded, our estimates may suffer from sample 
selection biases. The use of Heckman two-step estimation technique is one possible way to address this 
issue. However, our dataset is huge, including approximately 60 million observations. The estimation of 
non-linear models including the Heckman model with a larger number of dummy variables for such a 
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     Our first specification for estimation includes exporter-importer-product and 
exporter-importer-year fixed effects. The former controls for various time-invariant factors 
such as geography, cultural factors, or demand elasticity. Time-variant country-pair specific 
factors are controlled for by the latter, including the existence of trade preferences (e.g., RTA) 
or exchange rates. The estimation result is shown in column (I) in Table 1. The coefficient for 
tariffs is estimated to be significantly positive, indicating a slight decrease in trade prices 
due to tariff reductions. Specifically, it shows that a 1% reduction of (one plus) tariffs 
decreases trade prices by 0.04%, i.e., consumer prices decrease by more than the extent of 
tariff reduction.  
===   Table 1   === 
     We further introduce fixed effects. In column (II), we add exporter-product-year fixed 
effects. This type of fixed effects will control for production condition in export countries, 
particularly wages. The coefficient for tariffs is again significant, but here, it is negative; this 
indicates that a tariff reduction raises trade prices. In column (III), we introduce importer-
product-year fixed effects, which control completely for product-level demand size of 
importers. Furthermore, this type of fixed effects absorbs any variation in MFN rates among 
importers (although our sample importers include non-WTO member countries). Thus, in 
this specification, the variation in tariffs comes completely from preferential tariff rates. The 
coefficient for tariffs is again estimated to be positive. 
     To check the robustness of this positive coefficient, we estimate two other models.8 In 
both models, we use the same set of fixed effects as those in column (III) in Table 1. First, 
based on the conservative classification of Rauch (1999), we estimate for differentiated 
products and non-differentiated products separately. The coefficients are significantly 
positive in both types of products although the absolute magnitude is slightly larger in the 
case of non-differentiated products. Second, we examine lagged effects of tariffs by 
introducing either or both one-year, three-year, and five-year lagged tariff variables in 
addition to the concurrent tariff variable. Although the significance of coefficients differs by 
specifications, the sign with statistical significance is always positive. 
 
2.2. Effects on Quality-adjusted Trade Prices and Quality 
     In this subsection, to obtain clues on the mechanism underlying the positive effects of 
tariffs on gross trade prices, we decompose gross trade prices into the quality component 
and all other components. To this end, we employ the method proposed by Khandelwal et 
al. (2013). Specifically, we first estimate the following (demand) equation by the OLS: 
ln 𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜎ℎ𝑗 ln ((1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡) × 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡) = uℎ + u𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
                                                   
number of observations is beyond the capacity of our computers. The basic statistics are reported in Table 
B1 in Appendix B. 
8 The result are given in Appendix B. 
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where ln 𝑄ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a log of trade quantity in terms of kilograms, 𝜎ℎ𝑗 is demand elasticity of 
product h of importer j,9 and uℎ and u𝑗𝑡 are product and importer-year fixed effects, 
respectively. We introduce tariff rates on the left-hand side of the equation to approximate 
consumer prices. We estimate this equation by sections of HS tariff classifications. Then, we 
recover product quality z by computing 
ln ?̂?ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜖ℎ̂𝑖𝑗𝑡 (𝜎ℎ𝑗 − 1)⁄  
The log of quality-adjusted trade prices (QaPrice) is obtained as 
ln 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ln ?̂?ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
     Table 2 reports the estimates for similar specifications as in Table 1, here for quality-
adjusted prices and quality separately.10 In all specifications, the coefficients for tariffs are 
significantly negative for quality-adjusted prices and significantly positive for quality. For 
example, column (III) shows that a 1% reduction of (one-plus) tariff rates decreases product 
quality by 1.2% and increases quality-adjusted trade prices by 1.1%. Naturally, the sum of 
the coefficients for quality-adjusted prices and quality is equal to the coefficient found in 
Table 1. In particular, when the absolute magnitude is larger in the quality equation than in 
the quality-adjusted trade prices equation, as in columns (I) and (III), the coefficient in gross 
trade prices becomes positive. 
===   Table 2   === 
     We also estimate similar models as in the previous subsection for quality-adjusted 
trade prices and quality separately.11 When estimating the model separately for trade in 
differentiated and non-differentiated products, we again obtain the negatively significant 
coefficient for quality-adjusted prices and the positively significant coefficient for quality. 
In addition, for both quality-adjusted trade prices and quality, the absolute magnitude is 
larger for differentiated products than non-differentiated products. When we introduce 
lagged tariff variables, we obtain similar results for the concurrent tariffs as found earlier 
for both quality-adjusted trade prices and quality equations. However, almost all lagged 
variables have the opposite sign to that found for the concurrent tariff variable. Nevertheless, 
the sum of the coefficients for one- and more-year lagged variables is much smaller than the 
coefficient for the concurrent tariff variable in terms of an absolute value. Therefore, the total 
effect is still negative for quality-adjusted trade prices and positive for quality. 
In sum, we have shown that a tariff reduction in the destination country (1) decreases 
                                                   
9 Data on elasticities at country-HS three-digit level were obtained from Broda et al. (2017). 
10 There might be two empirical issues with our estimation. First, the demand function used in estimating 
the quality is based on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. Nevertheless, the tariff 
pass-through rate is not necessarily perfect because we consider its average rate. The entry and exit of 
heterogenous firms in the export market, i.e., extensive margin, may change the average rate of tariff 
pass-through. Second, because the dependent variable in the demand function includes tariff rates, 
regressing quality (and quality-adjusted trade prices) on tariff rates yields an endogeneity concern. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to address this type of endogeneity bias. However, we consider that more 
serious biases in quality (and quality-adjusted trade prices) result from not taking into account the 
difference in tariff rates across countries, products, and years when estimating the demand equation. 
11 These results are available in Appendix B. 
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gross trade prices (negative tariff pass-through); (2) decreases the quality of exported 
products, and (3) increases quality-adjusted trade prices. The first result implies the 
presence of a Lerner paradox for gross trade prices. Furthermore, given our observation that 
the degree of increases in quality-adjusted trade prices is greater than the degree of tariff 
reduction, a tariff reduction also increases tariff-inclusive quality-adjusted prices. This 
implies the presence of a Metzler paradox for quality-adjusted trade prices. These results 
are different from those of Ludema and Yu (2016), who investigated how changes in foreign 
tariffs affect U.S. export prices at the firm level and found that a Metzler paradox is possible 
for the (quality-unadjusted) gross trade prices.  
 
3. Theoretical Analysis 
In this section, we build a model to explain our empirical results. The model 
incorporates a heterogeneous-quality model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson 
(2012) into the heterogeneous-firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008)’s model, firms’ markups are variable, and trade liberalization affects the 
degree of market competition. Specifically, we consider a situation where firms with 
different productivity supply products with different quality. 
 
3.1. Basic Setup 
Our model contains two countries indexed by 𝑗 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} , and consumers in these 
countries have the same preference. There are (exogenously given) M product categories 
and one numéraire good in the economy, and producers supply varieties of products in each 
product category h. The representative consumer's utility function in country j is quasi-
linear and given by 
𝑈𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗 + ∑ [𝛼 ∫ 𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑑𝑖 −
1
2
𝛾 ∫ (𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗 )
2
𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈Ω
−
𝜂
2
(∫ 𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈Ω
)
2
𝑖∈Ω
]
𝑀
ℎ=1
,                 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑗 is the individual's consumption of the numéraire good, 𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 is the individual 
consumption of each variety 𝑖 ∈ Ω of the product category h. This variety of consumption 
is measured in units of utility and defined as 𝑥ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 , where 𝑧ℎ𝑖 is the quality of 
variety i and 𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 is the physical units of variety i. Note that the quality of each variety is 
common across markets. The parameter 𝜂 (> 0) captures the degree of substitutability 
among the varieties in the industry. As 𝜂  becomes lower, products become more 
differentiated. Other parameters satisfy 𝛼 > 0 and γ ≥ 0 . The budget constraint of the 
representative consumer in country j is 𝑦𝑗 + ∑ [∫ 𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑑𝑖]
𝑖∈Ω
𝑀
ℎ=1 ≤ 𝐼
𝑗, where 𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 is the price 
of variety i and 𝐼𝑗 is the consumer’s income.  
By maximizing Equation (1) with respect to 𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗
, subject to the budget constraint, the 
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inverse demand function for each variety is given by 
𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑧ℎ𝑖
𝑗 (𝛼 − 𝛾𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗 − 𝜂𝑋ℎ
𝑗),                                                   (2) 
where 𝑋ℎ
𝑗 = ∫ 𝑧ℎ𝑖𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈Ω
 is the total individual consumption of the differentiated goods 
measured in units of utility in product category h. Define 𝑃ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑧ℎ𝑖⁄  as the quality-
adjusted price of variety i in country j. By transforming Equation (2), the physical demand 
for variety i is given by 
𝑄ℎ𝑖
𝑗 ≡ 𝐿𝑗𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗 =
𝐿𝑗
𝛾𝑧ℎ𝑖
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 − 𝑃ℎ𝑖
𝑗 ),                                            (3) 
where 𝐿𝑗  is the mass of consumers in country j and 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗
 is the ceiling of the quality-
adjusted price below which 𝑞𝑖
𝑗 > 0 holds. The price ceiling is calculated as 
𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 ≡
𝛾𝛼 + 𝜂𝑁ℎ
𝑗?̅?ℎ
𝑗
𝛾 + 𝜂𝑁ℎ
𝑗
,                                                     (4) 
where 𝑁𝑗 is the measure of the consumed variety of the same product category and ?̅?ℎ
𝑗 =
(1/𝑁ℎ
𝑗) ∫ 𝑃ℎ𝑖
𝑗 𝑑𝑖
𝑖∈Ω
 is the average quality-adjusted price in country j.  
On the supply side, labor is the only factor of production. We assume both countries 
produce the numéraire good and free trade prevails in that sector. In producing the 
numéraire good, the two countries utilize the same production technology, and one unit of 
labor produces one unit of the good. These assumptions ensure that wages in the two 
countries become identical and unity. In producing a variety of non-numéraire, product 
category h in country j, each firm must pay a fixed entry fee, 𝑓ℎ
𝑗
, and draws its marginal 
processing cost, c, from a distribution denoted by 𝐺(𝑐). Firm i’s profit earned in country j is 
given by 
𝜋ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = (
𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗
𝜏ℎ
𝑗
− 𝑐) 𝑄ℎ𝑖
𝑗 ,                                                                 (5) 
where 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 ≥ 1 is the one plus applied, ad valorem tariff on the imports in country j of 
product h, where 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 = 1 holds if variety i is sold domestically. 
By substituting 𝑞ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = 𝑄ℎ𝑖
𝑗 /𝐿𝑗  into Equation (1) and using Equation (4) and the budget 
constraint, the indirect utility of function takes the following form:  
𝑈𝑗 = 𝐼𝑗 + ∑ [
1
2
(𝜂 +
𝛾
𝑁ℎ
𝑗
)
−1
(𝛼 − ?̅?ℎ
𝑗)
2
+
𝑁ℎ
𝑗
2𝛾
(σℎ
𝑗 )
2
]
𝑀
ℎ=1
,                                (6) 
where σℎ
𝑗 ≡ √∫ (𝑃ℎ𝑖
𝑗 − ?̅?ℎ
𝑗)2/
𝑖∈Ω
𝑁ℎ
𝑗
 represents the standard deviation of prices of product h 
in country j. The consumer’s utility is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the average quality-
adjusted price, increasing in the number of varieties in each product category, and 
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increasing in the variance of prices.12 These properties of the indirect utility function are the 
same as those of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), although their price in the utility is the quality-
adjusted price in our model.  
 
3.2. Price, Quantity, and Quality of Each Variety 
Following Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2012), the quality of each variety 
depends on the producing firm's marginal cost, and it is given by 𝑧ℎ𝑖 = 𝑐
1+𝜃, where 1 + 𝜃 
is the extent to which higher marginal costs are associated with higher quality (i.e., quality 
elasticity) and 𝜃 ∈ (−1, +∞).13  
By maximizing 𝜋ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 with respect to 𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 , and by deriving each firm’s profit as the 
function of its marginal cost, 𝜋ℎ
𝑗 (𝑐), we obtain the cut-off level of marginal costs at which 
the profit is equal to zero, 𝜋ℎ
𝑗 (𝑐) = 0.14 When a firm producing in country j sells the good 
in country j, it is free from the tariff, and the cut-off level is given by 𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗 ≡ (𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 )−
1
𝜃. If a 
firm producing outside country j exports the good to country j, it is subject to tariff and the 
cut-off level is given by 𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡ (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 /𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 )
1
𝜃 = (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
1
𝜃𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗
. 
   By using these cut-offs, the export price and export quantity are respectively given by 
𝑝ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐) ≡
𝑝ℎ
𝑗(𝑐)
𝜏ℎ
𝑗
=
𝑐1+𝜃
2
[(𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
−𝜃
+ 𝑐−𝜃],                                       (7) 
𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐) =
𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝐿𝑗
2𝛾𝑐1+𝜃
[(𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
−𝜃
− 𝑐−𝜃].                                                  (8) 
Then, the profits of the domestic firms and those of the other country’s exporting firms 
earned in country j are, respectively, given by 
𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝑗 (𝑐) =
𝐿𝑗
4𝛾
[(𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
− 𝑐−𝜃]
2
  ,                                                       (9) 
 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐) =
𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝐿𝑗
4𝛾
[(𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
−𝜃
− 𝑐−𝜃]
2
.                                                   (10) 
The relationship between the profit and the marginal cost depends on the sign of 𝜃, as is 
                                                   
12 Utility is increasing in the variance of prices because consumers can shift their expenditures towards 
lower priced varieties within each product category.  
13 Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) empirically found that higher input costs is associated with higher 
product quality. Others, such as Antoniades (2015), Ludema and Yu (2016), and Fieler et al. (2018), 
explicitly consider each firm's endogenous choice of quality. However, our product-level data cannot 
identify firm-level quality differences. Therefore, and as suggested by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), as 
long as the variation in firm-specific quality choice depends only on firm-specific draw of production 
costs, the "power-function approach" of the cost-quality nexus is a reasonable approximation in 
calculating the average level of quality within each product category. 
14 The detailed calculation of the cutoff is provided in Appendix C.  
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summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1 A lower marginal cost increases the firm's profit if 𝜃 < 0, and a higher marginal cost 
increases the profit if 𝜃 > 0. 
 
    When 𝜃 < 0 holds, both 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝑗 (𝑐) and 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐) are decreasing in 𝑐, and firms with low 
marginal costs survive in country j’s market. Even though higher product quality comes 
with higher marginal cost, the cost-increasing effect dominates the quality-enhancing effect, 
and lower c corresponds to higher profits. In this case, the market equilibrium is 
characterized by productivity sorting, where a firm with lower c charges lower prices, has a 
higher market share, earns higher profits, and is more likely to survive. When 𝜃 > 0 holds, 
however, the profits are increasing in 𝑐 . In this case, higher c leads to an exponential 
increase in quality, and quality sorting occurs. Namely, a firm with higher marginal cost 
charges a higher price and a lower quality-adjusted price in the market, earns higher profits, 
and is more likely to survive in the market. 
The effects of changes in the cut-off level of marginal cost on the price and profits also 
depend on the sign of 𝜃, as summarized in the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2 An increase in the cut-off level of the marginal cost in country j increases prices and the 
firms’ profits earned in country j under productivity sorting (𝜃 < 0), but it decreases them under 
quality sorting (𝜃 > 0). 
 
Under productivity sorting, the cost effect dominates the quality effect, and an increase in 
the cut-off level means that firms with higher marginal costs can survive in the market. 
Because these new surviving-firms have higher marginal costs than the original surviving 
firms, they set higher prices. In response, the original surviving firms raise prices and their 
profits increase. Under quality sorting, however, the quality effect is large enough to 
outweigh the cost effect, and firms with higher c are more competitive in the product market. 
In this case, an increase in the cut-off level means more competitive firms remain in the 
market. These firms lower their prices, and profits decrease for the original surviving firm. 
Below, we subsequently examine tariff pass-through under productivity sorting and quality 
sorting.   
 
3.3. Tariff Pass-Through under Productivity Sorting 
Let us first investigate the case with 𝜃 < 0 , where both 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝑗 (𝑐)  and 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)  are 
decreasing in c. In this case, firms in country j with 𝑐 < 𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 survive in the domestic market, 
whereas those with 𝑐 < 𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗  who produce outside country j export their good to country j. 
We assume that a cost draw follows a Pareto distribution and is given by 𝐺(𝑐) = (𝑐/𝑐𝑀)𝑘 
with support on 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝑐𝑀] , where k (≥ 1 ) is the shape parameter. The corresponding 
12 
 
density function is 𝐺′(𝑐) = 𝑘𝑐𝑘−1/(𝑐𝑀)𝑘. According to this distribution function, there are 
fewer low-cost firms than high-cost firms. 
The free-entry principle implies that the ex-ante expected profits of product category 
h upon entry in country j should be equal to 𝑓ℎ
𝑗
 . For instance, the expected profits from 
locating and producing in country A consist of the expected profit from the domestic supply, 
𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝐴 (𝑐), and the expected profit from exporting to country B, 𝜋𝑋
𝐵(𝑐). Given the cut-off levels 
of firm entry, the two countries' free-entry conditions are given by 
∫ 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝐴 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐) + ∫ 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝐵 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝐵
0
𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝐴
0
= 𝑓ℎ
𝐴,                                  (11) 
∫ 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝐵 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐) + ∫ 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝐴 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝐴
0
𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝐵
0
= 𝑓ℎ
𝐵.                                  (12) 
By using Equations (9) and (10), the equilibrium cut-off level, ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 (𝑗 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}), is determined 
by solving Equations (11) and (12): 
?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 = [
{𝑓ℎ
𝑗 − 𝜌ℎ
𝑙 𝑓ℎ
𝑙}Φ
{1 − 𝜌ℎ
𝑗𝜌ℎ
𝑙 }𝐿𝑗
]
1
𝑘−2𝜃
 (𝑙 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 𝑙 ≠ 𝑗),                                    (13) 
where 𝜌ℎ
𝑗 ≡ (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
𝑘−𝜃
𝜃 < 1  and 𝛷 ≡ 2𝛾(𝑘 − 𝜃)(𝑘 − 2𝜃)𝑐𝑀
𝑘 /𝜃2 > 0 . Because 𝜃 < 0 , 𝜌𝑗  
corresponds to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)’s “freeness” of trade and is decreasing in 𝜏𝑗. To 
ensure that ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 > 0 holds, we assume 𝑓ℎ
𝑗 − 𝜌ℎ
𝑙 𝑓ℎ
𝑙 > 0. The cost cut-off for exporting to 
country j becomes ?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
1
𝜃?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
.  
     The right-hand side of Figure 1 depicts the determination of the cut-off level in the two 
countries. The combination of cut-off levels that satisfies the free-entry conditions of both 
country A and country B are, respectively, depicted as the 𝑎𝑎 curve and 𝑏𝑏 curve. These 
curves’ downward slope can be explained as follows. A lower marginal cost cut-off in the 
other country implies, on average, lower expected profits from exporting because more 
productive firms operate in that country. Furthermore, it discourages the domestic firm’s 
entry and makes the domestic market less competitive, thereby increasing the domestic 
country’s cut-off level because the less productive firm can make a positive profit. The 
intersection of the two curves determines the equilibrium cut-offs. Because more entries 
correspond to a lower cut-off of the marginal cost, the number of varieties available in 
country j, ?̃?𝑗 is decreasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
, as depicted in the left-hand side of Figure 1 for country 
B.15  
===   Figure 1   === 
      In the short run, a tariff decrease simply hurts domestic firms in country B and 
                                                   
15 By Equation (8) and given the distribution, 𝐺(𝑐) , the average quality-adjusted price of good h in 
country j is calculated as ?̅?ℎ
𝑗 = (2𝑘 − 𝜃)(?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
/{2(𝑘 − 𝜃)}. By substituting this price into Equation (4), 
the number of varieties sold in country j is given by ?̃?ℎ
𝑗 = −2𝛾(𝑘 − 𝜃) [𝛼 − (?̃?𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
] /𝜃𝜂(?̃?𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
. 
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benefits firms in country A. In the long-run, however, tariff decreases change the number of 
entrants in each country. Let us now examine how trade liberalization affects the cut-off 
level of marginal costs. According to Equation (13) and ?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
1
𝜃?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 , a decrease in 𝜏𝑗 
increases both ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 and ?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
 with 𝜃 < 0. Suppose that country B reduces its tariff. Trade 
liberalization then increases the expected profit from entry in country A. The free-entry 
conditions then raise the number of the entrants in country A and decrease ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐴 , given the 
level of ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐵 . This effect is illustrated in Figure 2, where the 𝑎𝑎 curve shifts inside to the 𝑎′𝑎 
curve. Because more productive firms export to country B on average, trade liberalization 
decreases the expected profit in country B. Therefore, it reduces the number of the entrants 
in country B and increases ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐵 . This implies that less productive producers enter country B. 
This is the sorting effect of trade liberalization. 
===   Figure 2   === 
Furthermore, because the decrease in the number of the domestic varieties in the 
liberalization country exceeds the increase in the number of the foreign varieties, trade 
liberalization decreases the number of varieties consumed in country B, as is depicted in the 
left-side of Figure 2, while it increases the number of entrants in country A. This is the firm-
delocation effect of trade liberalization. 
     Now, we calculate the price and quality effects of a tariff reduction. Because our trade 
data are product-level rather than firm-level, we need to calculate the average export price 
of each product category in order to examine tariff pass-through. Specifically, our empirical 
analysis uses the unit value of each product category as the average export price. Total 
export values are given by 𝑇𝑉ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = ∫ 𝑝ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗
0
, and the total export quantity is 
given by 𝑇𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = ∫ 𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗
0
 . Then, average export prices defined by unit values 
become 
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡
𝑇𝑉ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑇𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗
=
(𝑘 − 2𝜃 − 1)(𝑘 − 𝜃 − 1)
𝑘(𝑘 − 2𝜃)
?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 .                                      (14) 
We should also calculate the average quality-adjusted prices, which are defined as the 
average export prices divided by average quality of exported products. The average quality 
is given by 
𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗 =
1
𝐺(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
∫ 𝑐1+𝜃𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗
0
=
𝑘
𝑘 + 𝜃 + 1
(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
1+𝜃
.                               (15) 
Then, the average quality-adjusted export price is given by 
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗
=
(𝑘 − 2𝜃 − 1){𝑘2 − (1 + 𝜃)2}
𝑘2(𝑘 − 2𝜃)
(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
−𝜃
.                            (16) 
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By differentiating Equation (14) with respect to 𝜏ℎ
𝑗
, we obtain the tariff elasticity of 
export price as  
𝑑 ln ?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
=
(1 − 𝜌ℎ
𝑗𝜌ℎ
𝑙 ) + 𝜌ℎ
𝑙 (𝑘 − 𝜃)
𝜃(1 − 𝜌ℎ
𝑗 𝜌ℎ
𝑙 )(𝑘 − 2𝜃)
≡ 𝜀ℎ𝑋
𝑗 < 0.                                    (17) 
By Equation (15), the tariff elasticity of export quality is given by  
𝑑 ln 𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
= (1 + 𝜃)𝜀ℎ𝑋
𝑗 < 0,                                                           (18) 
and the tariff elasticity of the quality-adjusted export price becomes  
𝑑 ln ?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
= −𝜃𝜀ℎ𝑋
𝑗 < 0.                                                                    (19) 
Because of the firm-delocation effect described above, trade liberalization decreases 
the number of varieties in the domestic market, which softens market competition and 
increases the average quality-adjusted price in the domestic country. Furthermore, less 
productive producers survive in the liberalizing country, and this sorting effect makes the 
market competition softer and increases average quality-adjusted prices in the liberalizing 
country. Such productivity sorting also increases the product’s average quality because 
firms with higher marginal costs produce higher-quality varieties. Therefore, trade 
liberalization also increases the average gross price. The following proposition summarizes 
these effects:  
 
Proposition 1 Under productivity sorting, a decrease in the tariff in the destination country 
increases the average gross price, average quality, and average quality-adjusted price of exported 
products.    
 
The direction of the change in quality-adjusted price is consistent with our empirical 
result. The directions of changes in (gross) export price and export quality, however, are 
opposite to our empirical results. This indicates that our productivity sorting model is 
inappropriate to explain the product-level tariff pass-through of worldwide trade. 
 
3.4. Tariff Pass-Through under Quality Sorting 
Let us next investigate the case with 𝜃 > 0 , where both 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝑗 (𝑐)  and 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)  are 
increasing in c. In this case, we will observe the quality sorting of firms. Contrary to the 
productivity-sorting case, firms with 𝑐 > 𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 survive in the domestic market of country j, 
and firms with 𝑐 > 𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗  export to country j. Here, a Pareto distribution of firm’s cost draws 
is given by 𝐺(𝑐) = 1 − (𝑐0/𝑐)
𝑘 , such that there are fewer high-quality firms than low-
quality firms. The corresponding density function is 𝐺′(𝑐) = 𝑘𝑐0
𝑘/𝑐𝑘+1.  
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The two countries’ free-entry conditions are given by 
∫ 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝐴 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐) + ∫ 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝐵 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
+∞
𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝐵
+∞
𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝐴
= 𝑓ℎ
𝐴,                                            (20) 
∫ 𝜋ℎ𝐷
𝐵 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐) + ∫ 𝜋ℎ𝑋
𝐴 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
+∞
𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝐴
+∞
𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝐵
= 𝑓ℎ
𝐵 .                                            (21) 
The right-hand side of Figure 3 depicts these free-entry conditions. As in Figure 1, the 𝑎𝑎 
curve represents the free-entry condition in country A, and the 𝑏𝑏 curve represents that in 
country B. Their downward slope reflects the fact that a higher cut-off level in the foreign 
country means that the firms producing higher-quality good operate in that country, 
diminishing the expected profits from exporting and discouraging the domestic firm’s entry. 
The reduced entry makes the domestic market less competitive, which decreases the cut-off 
level of the domestic country because lower-quality firms can make positive profits.  
===   Figure 3   === 
By solving Equations (20) and (21), the cut-off level of the domestic survival is given 
by  
?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 = [
{1 − 𝜆ℎ
𝑗 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 }Ψ𝐿𝑗
𝑓ℎ
𝑗 − 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 𝑓ℎ
𝑙
]
1
𝑘+2𝜃
 (𝑙 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}, 𝑙 ≠ 𝑗),                                      (22) 
where 𝜆ℎ
𝑗 ≡ (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
−
𝑘+𝜃
𝜃 < 1  and  Ψ ≡ 𝜃2𝑐0
𝑘/[2𝛾(𝑘 + 𝜃)(𝑘 + 2𝜃)𝑓𝐸] > 0 . We assume 𝑓ℎ
𝑗 −
𝜆𝑙𝑓ℎ
𝑙 > 0 to ensure that ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 > 0 holds. The cost cut-off for exporting to country j becomes 
?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
1
𝜃?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
. The number of varieties sold in country j is given by  
?̃?ℎ
𝑗 =
2𝛾(𝑘 + 𝜃) [𝛼 − (?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
]
𝜃𝜂(?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
.                                                   (23) 
As is depicted in the left-hand side of Figure 3, an increase in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 increases ?̃?ℎ
𝑗
 . Under 
quality sorting, a higher cut-off of the marginal cost (i.e., a higher cut-off quality) 
corresponds to more entries, and thus the number of variety available in country j, ?̃?𝑗, is 
increasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
.  
Let us consider the effect of trade liberalization. For instance, a reduction to the import 
tariff in country B shifts the 𝑎𝑎 curve outside to the 𝑎′𝑎′ curve in Figure 4 because it 
increases the expected profits from producing in country A and the increased entry 
increases ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐴  given ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐵 . As a result, trade liberalization decreases ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐵  and decreases the 
number of varieties consumed in the liberalizing country (firm-delocation effect). A 
decrease in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝐵  comes with a decrease in ?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝐵 , which decreases the average cost of firms 
exporting to country B. Because the former effect increases the average quality-adjusted 
price whereas the latter effect decreases it, the overall effect is ambiguous. 
===   Figure 4   === 
With regard to the average quality, because a reduction in 𝜏𝑗 lowers ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
 and thereby 
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decreases ?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
, relatively lower-cost, lower-quality firms survive in the liberalizing country. 
Therefore, the average quality decreases with a tariff reduction. The negative effect of trade 
liberalization on average quality is in contrast to the positive effect of trade liberalization on 
average quality under productivity sorting.  
Because trade liberalization decreases the average quality, it may decrease the average 
gross price of exported products, even if the average quality-adjusted price increases. The 
following analysis shows that the quality effect is large enough to derive the positive 
correlation between tariffs and average gross trade prices (i.e., a Lerner paradox). The total 
export values are given by 𝑇𝑉ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = ∫ 𝑝ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
+∞
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗 , and the total export quantity is 
by 𝑇𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 = ∫ 𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗 (𝑐)𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
+∞
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗 . Then, the average unit value of exports becomes 
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡
𝑇𝑉ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑇𝑄ℎ𝑋
𝑗
=
(𝑘 + 2𝜃 + 1)(𝑘 + 𝜃 + 1)
𝑘(𝑘 + 2𝜃)
?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 .                                     (24) 
The average quality and quality-adjusted unit value of exports are respectively given by  
𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗 =
1
1 − 𝐺(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
∫ 𝑐1+𝜃𝑑𝐺(𝑐)
+∞
𝑐ℎ̃𝑋
𝑗
=
𝑘
𝑘 − 𝜃 − 1
(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
1+𝜃
,                    (25) 
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡
?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗
=
(𝑘 + 2𝜃 + 1){𝑘2 − (1 + 𝜃)2}
𝑘2(𝑘 + 2𝜃)
(?̃?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
−𝜃
.                               (26) 
We assume 𝑘 > 1 + 𝜃 holds to ensure that the average quality is positive.  
By differentiating Equations (31), (32), and (33) with respect to the destination’s tariff, 
we have  
𝑑 ln ?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
=
(𝑘 + 𝜃) + (1 − 𝜆ℎ
𝑗 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 )𝜃
𝜃(1 − 𝜆ℎ
𝑗 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 )(𝑘 + 2𝜃)
≡ 𝜖ℎ𝑋
𝑗 > 0,                               (27) 
𝑑 ln 𝑧ℎ̅𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
= (1 + 𝜃)𝜖ℎ𝑋
𝑗 > 0,                                                                 (28) 
𝑑 ln ?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
= −𝜃𝜖ℎ𝑋
𝑗 < 0.                                                                         (29) 
These results are consistent with our empirical results, as the following proposition 
summarizes:   
 
Proposition 2 Under quality sorting, a decrease in tariff in the destination country decreases the 
average gross price and average quality of exported products, whereas it increases the average quality-
adjusted price of exported products.  
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A positive effect from the tariff on the gross export price implies that the quality sorting 
mechanism of exporters in our model explains the presence of the Lerner paradox observed 
in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, if we calculate the tariff elasticity of quality-adjusted 
consumer price of exports, we have  
𝑑 ln(𝜏ℎ
𝑗 ?̅?ℎ𝑋
𝑗 )
𝑑ln𝜏ℎ
𝑗
= −
𝜆ℎ
𝑗 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 (𝑘 + 𝜃)
(1 − 𝜆ℎ
𝑗 𝜆ℎ
𝑙 )(𝑘 + 2𝜃)
< 0.                                          (30) 
This means that a tariff decrease also increases the quality-adjusted consumer price in the 
importing country. Therefore, we can also explain the Metzler paradox for the quality-
adjusted price observed in the empirical results. 
Bagwell and Staiger (2012) and Bagwell and Lee (2015) suggested that market 
competition in imperfectly competitive environments with variable markups generates 
firm-delocation effects, which are driving forces behind the emergence of a Metzler paradox 
for the average quality-adjusted consumer price. Firm-delocation effects, however, cannot 
explain a Lerner paradox for gross trade prices. To show the presence of Lerner paradox, 
the model needs to incorporate a quality-sorting mechanism of Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) 
or Johnson (2012), where high-cost, high-quality firms are more competitive and more likely 
to be exporters. Our model is a hybrid of a firm-delocation model and quality-sorting model 
with heterogeneous firms, which enables us to explain the effects of trade liberalization at 
the product-level and export prices in worldwide trade. In other words, the worldwide 
product trade is characterized by price competition under variable markups and quality 
competition under quality sorting. The resulting entry and exit of firms in both export and 
domestic markets lead to the concurrence of Lerner and Metzler paradoxes. 
 
3.5. Welfare Effect of Trade Liberalization under Quality Sorting 
We have shown that our quality sorting model is consistent with the empirical results. 
Here, we discuss whether unilateral trade liberalization that generates a Lerner paradox for 
the average gross price and a Metzler paradox for the average quality-adjusted price 
improves the welfare of the liberalizing country. 
By Equation (6), the consumer’s utility is decreasing with the average quality-adjusted 
price, increasing with the number of varieties, and increasing with the variance of prices. 
The average quality-adjusted price under quality sorting is calculated as  
?̅?ℎ
𝑗 =
2𝑘 + 𝜃
2(𝑘 + 𝜃)
(?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
,                                                             (31) 
which is decreasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
. The variance of quality-adjusted prices is given by  
(σ̃ℎ
𝑗 )
2
=
𝑘𝜃2
4(𝑘 + 𝜃)2(𝑘 + 2𝜃)
(?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−2𝜃
,                                           (32) 
which is decreasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 .  By Equation (30), the number of varieties in country j is 
increasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
. 
18 
 
Under quality sorting, high-cost firms are more competitive because they produce 
high-quality products, and the positive quality effect outweighs the negative effect higher 
marginal costs. Hence, higher-cost firms set lower quality-adjusted prices, as is implied by 
Equation (30). Because trade liberalization in country j decreases ?̃?𝐷
𝑗
, Equation (23) implies 
that trade liberalization also reduces the number of varieties sold in that country.  
The firm-delocation effect under quality sorting makes the market less competitive, 
and average quality-adjusted prices increase with trade liberalization. A reduction in the 
number of varieties and a rise in quality-adjusted prices worsen the consumer’s utility in 
the importing country. By Equation (32), however, trade liberalization increases the variance 
of quality-adjusted prices, which improves the consumer’s utility. By substituting Equations 
(23), (31), and (32) into Equation (6), consumer utility is represented as a function of ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
:  
?̃?𝑗 = 𝐼𝑗 +
1
2𝜂
∑ [{𝛼 − (?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
} {𝛼 −
𝑘 + 𝜃
𝑘 + 2𝜃
(?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 )
−𝜃
}]
𝑀
ℎ=1
.                             (33) 
Because ?̃?𝑗 is increasing in ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗
, the negative effects from an increase in quality-adjusted 
prices and decrease in varieties dominate the positive effect from the increase in variance of 
quality-adjusted prices. As a result, trade liberalization hurts domestic consumers.  
 
Proposition 3 Even though a tariff reduction decreases the gross trade price, it worsens the welfare 
of liberalizing country because it substantially decreases the average quality, increases quality-
adjusted prices, and decreases the number of varieties.  
  
This proposition suggests that a unilateral tariff reduction should be accompanied by 
some additional policy reforms to ensure that the consumer benefits from trade 
liberalization. One such possible policy is to reduce the cost of entry. This would enhance 
competition in the liberalizing country and mitigate the increases in the quality-adjusted 
prices caused by the firm-delocation effect of trade liberalization. Note that Equation (22) 
suggests that a decline in 𝑓ℎ
𝑗
  increases ?̃?ℎ𝐷
𝑗 ,  implying the increased entries of firms 
intensifies competition in the domestic country, thereby inducing relatively low-quality 
firms to exit. A reduction in the cost of entry thus benefits domestic consumers. Therefore, 
if a competition policy that enhances domestic entry is enacted to accompany trade 
liberalization, such a policy will mitigate the negative effect of trade liberalization.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper started by quantifying the worldwide tariff pass-through, i.e., the impact 
of tariff reductions on trade prices. We found that a 1% reduction of (one plus) tariffs 
decreases trade prices by 0.1%, i.e., a negative tariff pass-through (Lerner paradox). To better 
understand the mechanism underlying this result, we next decomposed trade prices into 
product quality and quality-adjusted trade prices. As a result, we found that a 1% reduction 
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of (one-plus) tariff rates decreases product quality by 1.2% and increases quality-adjusted 
trade prices by 1.1% (Metzler paradox). To formalize these empirical findings, we 
constructed a theoretical model that demonstrates the mechanism underlying these 
empirical results. We suggested that a firm-delocation mechanism under variable markups 
and a quality-sorting mechanism are the driving forces behind these empirical findings.  
Our theoretical model indicates that although a lower tariff decreases the average 
consumer price of imported products, it comes with even lower quality of these products 
and thereby increases quality-adjusted consumer prices. The number of varieties of goods 
also decreases with trade liberalization. We show that a simple reform which unilaterally 
reduces import tariff hurts domestic consumers. To ensure that consumers benefit from 
trade liberalization, a reduction in the destination country’s tariff should be accompanied 
by additional policy reforms that prevent increases in quality-adjusted prices or that 
mitigate the drop in average quality of exported products.  
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Table 1. Global Average of Tariff Pass-through 
(I) (II) (III)
ln (1 + Tariff) 0.041*** -0.033*** 0.084***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.010]
Exporter-Importer-Product YES YES YES
Exporter-Importer-Year YES YES YES
Exporter-Product-Year NO YES YES
Importer-Product-Year NO NO YES
Number of obs 57,781,720 57,781,720 57,781,720
Adj R-squared 0.7499 0.7588 0.7749  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of trade prices. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Parentheses contain the robust standard error. 
 
 
Table 2. Decomposition into Quality-adjusted Prices and Quality 
(I) (II) (III)
Quality-adjusted prices
ln (1 + Tariff) -1.290*** -1.101*** -1.105***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.013]
Exporter-Importer-Product YES YES YES
Exporter-Importer-Year YES YES YES
Exporter-Product-Year NO YES YES
Importer-Product-Year NO NO YES
Number of obs 57,781,720 57,781,720 57,781,720
Adj R-squared 0.9617 0.9639 0.972
Quality
ln (1 + Tariff) 1.332*** 1.067*** 1.189***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.016]
Exporter-Importer-Product YES YES YES
Exporter-Importer-Year YES YES YES
Exporter-Product-Year NO YES YES
Importer-Product-Year NO NO YES
Number of obs 57,781,720 57,781,720 57,781,720
Adj R-squared 0.9285 0.932 0.9425  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Parentheses contain the robust 
standard error. 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium cut-offs under productivity sorting 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of trade liberalization on country B under productivity sorting 
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Figure 3. Equilibrium cut-offs under quality sorting 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Effect of trade liberalization on country B under quality sorting 
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Appendix A. Sample Countries 
 
A1. Importing Countries (70 Countries) 
ARG, AUS, BLZ, BRA, CAF, CAN, CHE, CHL, CHN, COL, CYP, DEU, DMA, DNK, DZA, 
ECU, EGY, ESP, FIN, FRA, GAB, GBR, GRC, GRD, GTM, HKG, HND, HRV, HUN, IDN, 
IND, IRL, ISL, ITA, JOR, JPN, KNA, KOR, LKA, LTU, LVA, MAC, MAR, MDG, MEX, MKD, 
MUS, MWI, MYS, NIC, NLD, NOR, NZL, OMN, PER, POL, PRT, SAU, SLV, SVK, SVN, SWE, 
TGO, THA, TUN, TUR, URY, USA, VCT, VEN 
 
A2. Exporting Countries (172 Countries) 
AFG, AGO, ALB, ARE, ARG, ARM, ATG, AUS, AUT, AZE, BDI, BEL, BEN, BFA, BGD, BGR, 
BHR, BIH, BLR, BLZ, BMU, BRA, BRB, BRN, BTN, BWA, CAF, CAN, CHE, CHL, CHN, CIV, 
CMR, COG, COL, COM, CPV, CRI, CUB, CYP, CZE, DEU, DJI, DMA, DNK, DOM, DZA, 
ECU, EGY, ERI, ESP, EST, ETH, FIN, FJI, FRA, GAB, GBR, GEO, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, 
GNQ, GRC, GRD, GTM, GUY, HKG, HND, HRV, HTI, HUN, IDN, IND, IRL, IRN, ISL, ISR, 
ITA, JAM, JOR, JPN, KAZ, KEN, KGZ, KHM, KNA, KOR, KWT, LAO, LBN, LBY, LCA, LKA, 
LSO, LTU, LUX, LVA, MAC, MAR, MDA, MDG, MDV, MEX, MKD, MLI, MLT, MMR, MNG, 
MOZ, MRT, MUS, MWI, MYS, NAM, NER, NGA, NIC, NLD, NOR, NPL, NZL, OMN, PAK, 
PAN, PER, PHL, PLW, PNG, POL, PRT, PRY, QAT, RUS, RWA, SAU, SDN, SEN, SGP, SLB, 
SLV, SUR, SVK, SVN, SWE, SWZ, SYC, SYR, TCD, TGO, THA, TJK, TKM, TON, TTO, TUN, 
TUR, TZA, UGA, UKR, URY, USA, UZB, VCT, VEN, VNM, VUT, YEM, ZAF, ZMB, ZWE 
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Appendix B. Other Tables 
 
    This appendix presents our robustness checks. First, the basic statistics are provided in 
Table B1. Second, we start with the estimation of our model on gross prices for some 
subsamples. A set of fixed effects is the same as that in column (III) in Table 1. Based on the 
conservative classification in Rauch (1999), we estimate for differentiated products and 
nondifferentiated products separately. The results are shown in Table B2. The coefficients 
are significantly positive for both types of products although the absolute magnitude is 
slightly larger in the case of nondifferentiated products. 
     We also examine the lagged effects of tariffs. A set of fixed effects is the same as that 
in column (III) in Table 1. In column (I) in Table B3, we introduce a one-year lagged tariff 
variable. Both concurrent and one-year lagged variables have significantly positive 
coefficients; the coefficient magnitude is larger in the lagged variable. In column (II), we also 
introduce three-year lagged tariff variable. Although the concurrent and three-year lagged 
variables have significantly positive coefficients, the coefficient for the one-year lagged 
variable turns out to be insignificant. Column (III) further introduces a five-year lagged 
variable and shows that only the coefficients for three-year and five-year lagged variables 
are significantly positive. In sum, although the significant coefficients differ by 
specifications, a sign with statistical significance is always positive. 
     Third, we separately estimate similar models for quality-adjusted prices and quality. 
A set of fixed effects is the same as that in column (III) in Table 2. In Table B4, we estimate 
the model for differentiated and nondifferentiated products separately. Both cases show a 
negatively significant coefficient for quality-adjusted prices and a positively significant 
coefficient for quality. In addition, for both quality-adjusted prices and quality, the absolute 
magnitude is larger for differentiated products than nondifferentiated products. 
     In Table B5, we introduce lagged tariff variables. The results of the concurrent tariffs 
are unchanged from those in Table 2 for both quality-adjusted prices and quality equations. 
The coefficients are negative for quality-adjusted prices but positive for quality. However, 
almost all lagged variables have the opposite sign to that on the concurrent tariff variable. 
This implies that one year after a tariff reduction, the reduction has had the effect of moving 
quality-adjusted prices and quality back to their original level. Nevertheless, the sum of the 
coefficients for one- and more-year lagged variables is much smaller than the coefficient for 
the concurrent tariff variable in terms of absolute value. Therefore, the total effect remains 
negative for quality-adjusted prices but positive for quality. 
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Table B1. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln Gross prices 57,781,720 2.524 1.733 -17.123 18.666
ln Quality-adjusted prices 57,781,720 4.211 5.327 -4.399 29.285
ln Quality 57,781,720 -1.687 5.044 -26.295 5.752
ln (1 + Tariff) 57,781,720 0.050 0.082 0 3.434
   * ln Importer's GDP 57,781,720 1.305 2.148 0 88.606
   * ln Exporter's GDP per capita 57,781,720 0.481 0.798 0 38.249
L1. ln (1 + Tariff) 50,367,256 0.047 0.080 0 3.434
L3. ln (1 + Tariff) 50,367,256 0.054 0.087 0 3.434
L5. ln (1 + Tariff) 50,367,256 0.062 0.095 0 3.434  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
 
Table B2. Global Average of Tariff Pass-through: Differentiated versus Nondifferentiated 
Products 
Differentiated Non-differentiated
ln (1 + Tariff) 0.063*** 0.108***
[0.012] [0.018]
Number of obs 41,024,355 16,727,990
Adj R-squared 0.7423 0.7855  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of trade prices. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Parentheses contain the robust standard error. In both specifications, we introduce exporter-
importer-product, exporter-importer-year, exporter-product-year, and importer-product-year fixed 
effects. 
 
 
Table B3. Global Average of Tariff Pass-through: Lagged Effects 
(I) (II) (III)
ln (1 + Tariff) 0.035*** 0.029** 0.015
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014]
L1. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.068*** 0.022 0.023
[0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
L3. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.092*** 0.081***
[0.011] [0.012]
L5. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.023**
[0.011]
Number of obs 55,099,219 53,242,877 50,367,256
Adj R-squared 0.7754 0.7769 0.7782  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of trade prices. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Parenthesis contain the robust standard error. In all specifications, we introduce exporter-
importer-product, exporter-importer-year, exporter-product-year, and importer-product-year fixed 
effects. 
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Table B4. Decomposition into Quality-adjusted Prices and Quality: Differentiated versus 
Nondifferentiated Products 
Differentiated Non-differentiated
Quality-adjusted prices
ln (1 + Tariff) -1.137*** -1.006***
[0.015] [0.026]
Number of obs 41,024,355 16,727,990
Adj R-squared 0.9728 0.9682
Quality
ln (1 + Tariff) 1.200*** 1.113***
[0.019] [0.031]
Number of obs 41,024,355 16,727,990
Adj R-squared 0.9431 0.9409  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of trade prices. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Parenthesis contain the robust standard error. In all specifications, we introduce exporter-
importer-product, exporter-importer-year, exporter-product-year, and importer-product-year fixed 
effects. 
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Table B5. Decomposition into Quality-adjusted Prices and Quality: Lagged Effects 
(I) (II) (III)
Quality-adjusted prices
ln (1 + Tariff) -1.233*** -1.234*** -1.230***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.019]
L1. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.172*** 0.145*** 0.138***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.019]
L3. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.062*** 0.063***
[0.014] [0.016]
L5. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.002
[0.014]
Number of obs 55,099,219 53,242,877 50,367,256
Adj R-squared 0.9723 0.9723 0.9723
Quality
ln (1 + Tariff) 1.269*** 1.263*** 1.244***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023]
L1. ln (1 + Tariff) -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.115***
[0.021] [0.023] [0.024]
L3. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.030* 0.018
[0.017] [0.020]
L5. ln (1 + Tariff) 0.022
[0.017]
Number of obs 55,099,219 53,242,877 50,367,256
Adj R-squared 0.943 0.9431 0.9433  
Notes: The dependent variable is a log of trade prices. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively. Parentheses contain the robust standard error. In all specifications, we introduce exporter-
importer-product, exporter-importer-year, exporter-product-year, and importer-product-year fixed 
effects. 
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Appendix C. The Derivation of the Cut-off Level of Marginal Cost 
By maximizing 𝜋ℎ𝑖
𝑗
 with respect to 𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗
, we obtain the profit-maximizing quantity of 
each variety as 
𝑄ℎ𝑖
𝑗 = (𝑝ℎ𝑖
𝑗 − 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐)
𝐿𝑗
𝛾(𝑧ℎ𝑖)2
.                          (𝐴1) 
Combining Equations (3) and (A1), we can represent price and quantity as a function of the 
firm's marginal cost: 
𝑝ℎ
𝑗(𝑐) =
𝑧ℎ𝑖
2
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 + 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐
𝑧ℎ𝑖
) =
𝑐1+𝜃
2
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 + 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐−𝜃), 
𝑄ℎ
𝑗(𝑐) =
𝐿𝑗
2𝛾𝑧ℎ𝑖
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 − 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐
𝑧ℎ𝑖
) =
𝐿𝑗
2𝛾𝑐1+𝜃
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 − 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐−𝜃). 
The quality-adjusted price is given by 𝑃𝑗(𝑐) = 𝑝𝑗(𝑐)/𝑧𝑖. The profit of a firm in country j 
whose marginal cost is c is given by 
𝜋ℎ
𝑗 (𝑐) =
𝐿𝑗
4𝛾𝜏ℎ
𝑗
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 − 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 𝑐−𝜃)
2
. 
 The cut-off level of the marginal cost is the marginal cost that satisfies 𝜋ℎ
𝑗 (𝑐) = 0. 
When the firm sells in the domestic country, 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 = 1, and the cut-off level is given by 𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗 ≡
(𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 )
−
1
𝜃 . When the firm exports to country j, 𝜏ℎ
𝑗 > 1 and the cut-off level is given by 
𝑐ℎ𝑋
𝑗 ≡ (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 /𝑃ℎ,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑗 )
1
𝜃 = (𝜏ℎ
𝑗 )
1
𝜃𝑐ℎ𝐷
𝑗
. 
